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INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES FOR
THE STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
AS A NONPROLIFERATION MEASURE
JOHN N. O'BRIEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy light water electric power reactors are operating presently in the U.S. and roughly forty more will become operational
during the next five years.1 U.S. designed Light Water Reactors
(LWRs) operate on low enriched uranium (LEU), which is uranium in
which the content of the U 23 1 component, the part that reacts, has
been "enriched" from its natural concentration of about 0.7% to between 3 and 4%. The enriched uranium is then pressed into small pellets, which are put into long stainless steel tubes called fuel rods.
These fuel rods are arranged into "bundles" which are then placed
into the reactor core. A typical electric power reactor contains about
100 metric tonnes (MT) of uranium fuel, about one-third of which
must be replaced yearly for optimal electrical production. The fuel
that is taken out and replaced by fresh fuel is called "spent fuel" and
is stored on racks under water in a storage pool at the reactor site. 2
Only about 1 or 2% of the potential energy in a LEU fuel has been
used when it must be replaced by new fuel. In the past, planners assumed that spent fuel would be sent to a "reprocessing" facility
where the unused part of the fuel would be recovered and recycled
back into power reactors. Spent fuel was considered to be valuable
enough to warrant selling or transferring it to a commercial reprocessing facility, where it would be recycled at a profit. All plans for nuclear energy production, from fuel fabrication to waste disposal, began with this assumption.
American policy on nuclear fuel cycles changed in 1977 to reflect
opposition against any type of reprocessing and a preference for longterm storage of spent fuel.4 The recognition that "weapons-grade"
*Technical Support Organization, Brookhaven National Laboratory.
1. US Nuclear Power Plants: Operating Experience, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 24-25
(August 1981); NUCLEAR REACTORS BUILT, BEING BUILT, OR PLANNED 5-9 (TID8200-R38 June 1978).
2. SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACT BOOK 5-9 (DOE/NE-0005 UC-85), April 1980)
[hereinafter FACT BOOK].
3. FEDERAL FACILITIES FOR STORING SPENT FUEL-ARE THEY NEEDED, 1
(GAO-EMD-79-82, NTIS No. PB-297, June 1979) [hereinafter FEDERAL FACILITIES].
4. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T. AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 500 (1980) [hereinafter NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
FACTBOOK].
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plutonium would be extracted and purified during reprocessing of
spent fuel, and that any nation with a reprocessing facility consequently might become a producer of nuclear explosives, prompted
this change in policy. In an effort to persuade other nations to forgo
reprocessing, the United States indefinitely deferred its own domestic
commercialization of reprocessing for purposes of electrical production.
As a direct result of the opposition to reprocessing, spent fuel has
been accumulating at reactor sites.' The earliness and universality of
the assumption that reprocessing would naturally follow nuclear reactor development has resulted in the routine construction of reactors lacking sufficient storage space for the spent fuel generated during the operating lifetime of the reactor. Consequently, the nuclear
power industry will face a dilemma during the lifetime of power reactors now operating. Spent fuel will have to be shipped and stored
somewhere or the reactors will be forced to shut down.
Various authorities have made differing projections of when reactors will run out of storage space. Measures can be taken to increase
the storage capacity of spent fuel pools at reactors. Reracking storage
racks, for example, improves capacity by a factor of over 1.5, by rearranging fuel racks to use space more optimally. Since nuclear materials are dangerous when spaced too closely because of their ability to
synergistically use additional neutron emissions to produce heat, the
use of neutron-absorbing material can more than double storage
capacity by reducing spacing requirements. The "transshipping" of
spent fuel from an older to a newer reactor in order to take advantage of unused storage space affords another option for utilities with
multiple nuclear generating units. Reactor operators normally should
leave sufficient space in the fuel storage pool to deposit the entire
fuel load in the core. This space, called the "full core reserve," is routinely kept empty, but can be used to store spent fuel with no significant decrease in safety. The only other solution available involves
transferring spent fuel to away-from-reactor (AFR) storage. 6
Physical alteration of spent fuel bundles may also increase storage
capacity by as much as four times. 7 These methods, which include
canning, compacting, or repacking spent fuel bundles, are still, however, under development.
Any prediction of the time remaining until it is necessary to stop
5. FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 6-9.
6. FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 15-21.
7. J. BRANSCOME, NUCLEAR FUEL 9 (May 25, 1981); J. M. VIEBROCK, ALTERNATIVES FOR WATER BASIN SPENT FUEL STORAGE (Report NAC-C-7915, Nuclear
Assurance Corp., Oct. 1979).
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reactor operation due to lack of storage space must account for
many factors, including:
the extent of utility rerack efforts
the number of reactors operating
the amount of transshipment that occurs
the length of time each reactor can run on a given quantity of fuel
whether full core reserve is maintained. 8
Official estimates of when AFR capacity will be required for continued reactor operations vary widely. For example, the Department
of Energy (DOE) estimated that 560 MT of AFR storage capacity
will be needed in 1983 and a cumulative total of 3,860 MT storage
will be needed by 1988.' A recent report by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), however, challenges DOE's figures. The GAO report
predicts a need for only a 152 MT capacity by 1983 and a 1,433 MT
capacity by 1988.1 GAO's report, based on a survey of 57 nuclear
energy reactor operators, accounts for increased capacity only at
those utilities with definite plans at the time of the study to increase
storage capacity. Thus, even GAO's own estimates may be overstated,
since many utilities had not yet decided to expand their storage
capacity at that time.
An additional factor may arise if the United States, to promote its
nonproliferation policy, decides to accept foreign spent fuel. The
DOE calculates that the upper limits for foreign spent fuel acquisition
will be from 905 to 5,270 MT by 1992.11 There is, however, enormous uncertainty in these figures because of the complexity of the
foreign affairs accompanying such transactions and the substantial
domestic opposition to storing foreign nuclear wastes.' 2
The assumption underlying this article is that an AFR facility will
be built, or an existing storage facility used to accommodate excess
spent fuel at some point in the near future. The construction and operation of such a facility will pose a number of institutional issues.
These issues will be largely independent of the specific time frame involved. A continuing policy favoring the deferral of reprocessing
clearly will, in time, preclude storage of spent fuel at reactor sites and
result in a need for long-term AFR storage. Should domestic reproc8. FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 22.
9. SPENT FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS-THE NEED FOR AWAY-FROMREACTOR STORAGE, DOE Report cited in FEDERAL FACILITIES, supra note 3.
10. FEDERAL FACILITIES, supra note 3, at 9.
11. Supra note 6.
12. See also, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON HANDLING
AND STORAGE OF SPENT LIGHT WATER REACTOR FUEL Vol. 1 at ES-3 (NUREG0404, March 1978).
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essing occur, there will still be a need for interim storage of excess
spent fuel because of long lead time necessary for reprocessing to actually occur.
Continued operation of existing nuclear power reactors depends
upon the future availability of some alternative to the at-reactor
spent fuel storage capacity presently in place. Even if speedy reprocessing of commercially generated spent fuel occurs in the U.S., the
large backlog of spent fuel and limited reprocessing throughout
capacity presently available necessitate interim storage in the future.
The shortage of spent fuel storage capacity and management of
nuclear wastes are worldwide problems. Most nations could readily
agree on common interests and goals, although not on solutions to
these problems. The Jekyll-and-Hyde nature of bomb-grade nuclear
material derives from its potential for providing a vast and abundant
supply of energy which could have enormous benefits for society
and, on the other hand, making real the possible unprecedented destruction of all that human cultures have laboriously developed during centuries of history. Such a force, once comprehended by those
cognizant of its enormous implications, may spur the pursuit of a solution for the management of spent nuclear fuel on a worldwide basis.
II. SPENT FUEL AND NONPROLIFERATION

Nuclear energy is an especially attractive source of electricity for
technologically underdeveloped nations lacking efficient indigenous
energy sources. The United States, initially under Eisenhower's
"Atoms-for-Peace" program and then throughout the 1960's promoted the use of nuclear technology on a global basis. The United
States signed numerous Agreements for Cooperation with nations
seeking the benefits of nuclear expertise and technology.' 3
Many nations both developed and underdeveloped have acquired
research reactors and the expertise to operate and study them. These
small reactors are not used to produce electricity, but solely for the
pursuit of knowledge about nuclear physics. Most of these reactors
use Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) which can, in sufficient quantity, be fabricated into a nuclear explosive. In any one research reactor, there is generally an insufficient amount of bomb-grade material
to construct an explosive device. The United States routinely accepts
spent fuel from many of these reactors. Consequently, most nations
with only research reactors could not easily construct an explosive
without, at a minimum, being explicit on an international level about
13. L. M. MUNTZING (ed.) INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (American Nuclear Society, IL 1978).
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heir intentions to build an atomic bomb. A nation's refusal to return
;pent fuel and insistence on having new fuel, inextricably evidences
;uch intentions.
The problem of spent fuel from energy production reactors accumulating worldwide lies at the heart of the nuclear nonproliferation
issue. The United States, in most of its international agreements, has
reserved the right of prior approval over the disposition and reprocessing of any fuel sold by its domestic vendors.1 4 Reprocessing spent
fuel will separate nuclear "waste" from those radioactive materials
capable of producing either more energy or nuclear explosives. New
fuel cannot be put to such uses because it is the operation of the reactor that creates weapons grade material. As a result, spent fuel represents the only real route to nuclear weapons capability via nuclear
energy. Thus far, the United States has considered its foreign nuclear
trading partners' requests to transfer spent fuel for any reason as it
has considered such requests from domestic utility corporationsthrough case-by-case adjudication.
Reprocessing of spent fuel provides a potential solution to the nuclear waste problem for many of America's trading partners. Both
France and the United Kingdom are now concluding contracts with
several nations for the retransfer and reprocessing of spent fuel.
Under these contracts, all components of the spent fuel will be returned separately (including the lethal nuclear wastes which are not
useful).
So far the U.S. has approved all transfers sought under British and
French contracts. Providing nuclear energy to nations to satisfy their
self-perceived need for sufficient electrical production, however questionable from America's viewpoint, is an altruistic and humanitarian
endeavor. Burdening those same nations, however, with the monumental issues entailed in nuclear waste management, and the constantly recurring decision of whether to produce nuclear armaments,
may be dangerous. These concerns may be intertwined to the extent
that nuclear trade may harm U.S. interests in the future unless fundamental arrangements for the disposition of spent fuel, and, therefore,
weapons grade material, are rationally addressed.
Immediate problems associated with the accumulation of weapons
grade material in nations using LWRs and LEU fuels can be averted.
A nation can claim entitlement to a well developed energy producing
technology more defensibly than it can overtly declare a desire for
nuclear weapons. This distinction may afford the United States an
opportunity to fulfill its goals of fostering the betterment of the
14. Id.
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world's citizens and, at the same time, minimize potential threats to
global stability.
If the United States agreed to supply nations not possessing nuclear weapons capability with fresh nuclear fuel on an assurable basis
in exchange for those nations' agreements to forfeit any claim to
weapons grade material in spent fuel, the trend towards the increasing likelihood of arms proliferation may be reversed or, at least, set
back. This article describes, in a comprehensive manner, one option
available for moving toward the ground between nuclear weapons
proliferation and global self-determination in energy matters. The establishment of an international repository for spent fuel, in which depositors could feel secure in their future nuclear energy plans and
options, would allow the satisfaction of global demand for nuclear
power without increasing the danger of arms proliferation.
The issues surrounding nuclear spent fuel management are far
reaching. They include regional and collective opposition to the storage of even domestically produced spent fuel. A fact of absolute importance is that DOE's nuclear weapons production program has generated substantial quantities of nuclear waste1 5 which must be dealt
with in a style similar, if not identical, to the management of waste
generated for the production of electricity. Whether the acceptance
of nuclear energy waste from small nations with the potential for nuclear weapons production by nature of their excess spent fuel
strengthens U.S. national security any less than continued production
of nearly identical wastes for production of additional U.S. nuclear
weapons is a question worthy of consideration.
A related issue involves the question of whether the United States
is prepared to offer a reasonable arrangement to nations which may
legitimately desire a nuclear-weapons-free status. These nations can
no longer accept unilateral assurances that U.S. policies will not
change, in view of previous vacillations. In oblique terms, the U.S.
may have to give up some degree of its sovereign control over the
global flow of nuclear materials in order to improve its own interests
and world security. The establishment of an internationally controlled spent fuel storage facility in the U.S. provides an alternative to
the presently unsatisfactory storage situation. This article explores
the institutional options available in making such a decision, and recommends the options most desirable in light of the current political
climate.
15. Jacksetic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive High Level Waste Management, 9 ENV'TL.
L. 347, 348-49 (1979).
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III. AFR STORAGE FACILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA)' 6 directs the
President to pursue the establishment of respositories for the storage
of spent nuclear reactor fuel under effective international auspices
and inspection.' ' The Act further directs the U.S. government to
offer financial compensation for the energy content of spent fuel
placed in such a facility should compensation appear necessary or desirable.I

8

The terms "international auspices and inspection" are vague. There
is virtually no legislative history associated with their usage in NNPA,
although the terms appeared in various versions of the bill while
under legislative consideration.' I International "inspection" is generally equated to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards,
but international "auspices" is a nebulous concept at best. 2 0
The very nature of NNPA's mandate indicates that a domestically
sited international AFR storage facility would be primarily subject to
international, not domestic, authority. Accordingly, the institution
responsible for an international AFR facility would be an international organization subject to international law, rather than a commercial organization which must be formed and operated under national laws.
An international AFR storage facility would solve the problem of
competing national objectives. The first objective such an institution
would satisfy would be the alleviation of spent fuel congestion. The
facility would accept spent fuel from nations which have a shortage
of storage capacity and, therefore, seek retransfer and/or reprocessing.
A competing national objective involves assuring an uninterrupted
fuel supply for operating reactors. These objectives conflict because
only 1 to 2% of the potential energy in nuclear fuel is used before it
must be removed from the reactor. Reprocessing and recycling the
useful portion of spent fuel significantly improves the efficiency of
uranium utilization, and thereby increases a nation's assurance of a
domestic fuel supply. Reprocessing and recycling are, however, very
16. 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (Supp. 11 1978).
17. Id., § 3223(a) (4).
18. Id., § 3223(a) (5).
19. The terms were used in the Administration, Bingham, and Percy versions (123
CONG. REC. S6788, 123 CONG. REC. H1714, and 123 CONG. REC. S3381 respectively)
as well as versions introduced in the 94th Congress (Hearingson S.1439 and S.3370 and
H.R. 15273, JCAE, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1976)).
20. Marshall, Section 104 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1 978-Establishment
of International Nuclear Supply Assurances, 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. POL. 399, 427-28
(1979).
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expensive at current nuclear fuel prices. Reprocessing and recycling
are not economically attractive to nations with small or moderate
nuclear energy programs. Economies of scale dictate that a large
throughput facility, serving around 50 reactors, may be the most economically efficient reprocessing and recycling facility.2 1
Currently, both France and the United Kingdom offer reprocessing
services on a commercial basis. Each has entered several contracts
with other nations to reprocess spent fuel. Neither has large-scale
plants in service at the present time, but France expects to complete
its La Hague facility during the 1980's and the U.K. also intends to
complete the planned Windscale facilities during this decade. 2 2 Many
transfers of spent fuel have been made to these countries in the last
several years from Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain. The spent
fuel which has been transferred is now in storage. The U.S. may exercise a right of prior approval over retransfers of spent fuel under
agreements between the U.S. and those nations retransferring their
spent fuel. The U.S. has approved every retransfer either on the basis
of contracts in existence before passage of NNPA, or because of a
confirmed lack of indigenous storage capacity. The U.S. still maintains the right of prior approval over the retransfer of separate plutonium (weapons grade material), uranium, and fission products (the
actual "waste") back to nations procuring commercial reprocessing
services. 2 3
The NNPA directs the President to:
seek to negotiate as soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production facilities or source material, and such other
nations and groups of nations, such as the IAEA, as may be deemed
appropriate, with a view toward the timely establishment of binding
international undertakings providing for(3) devising, consistent with the policy goals set forth in section 403
of this Act, feasible and environmentally sound approaches for the
siting, development, and management under effective international

auspices and inspection of facilities for the provision of nuclear fuel
services, including the storage of special nuclear material;
(4) the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent nuclear
reactor fuel under effective international auspices and inspection;
(5) the establishment of arrangements under which nations placing
spent fuel in such repositories would receive appropriate compensa21. "REPROCESSING, PLUTONIUM HANDLING, RECYCLE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 4," INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION, INFCE/

PC/2/4, at 7-11.
22. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 4, at 208-209.
23. Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § § 2121, 2124 (1978).
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tion for the energy content of such spent fuel 2if4 recovery of such energy content is deemed necessary or desirable.
The legislative history of NNPA indicates a congressional intent to
establish an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) which
would store spent fuel.
INFA would deal with both the front and the back end of the fuel
cycle. It could run repositories for the storage of spent nuclear fuel
and would provide for nations placing spent fuel in such repositories
to receive appropriate compensation for the energy content of the
spent fuel, if recovery of the energy content is deemed necessary or
desirable.2 s
Accordingly, this bill, S.897, contains a set of provisions for starting
the U.S. along the path of international cooperation toward the establishment of fuel assurances through such an organization. An international nuclear fuel authority, INFA as we refer to it, which
would deal with all aspects of the fuel cycle, including provision2for
the storage of spent fuel in facilities under international auspices. 6
Legislative history reflects a sentiment in Congress that domestic
siting of an international AFR storage facility may be acceptable and
even desirable:
I say it is more dangerous to have it [international AFR storage facility] in some remote area, easily accessible to some terrorist or some
irresponsible chief of state and his forces, than to have it right here.
Second, the U.S. must demonstrate to others that we are willing to
accept our fair share of the burden of solving the problem of providing secure storage for spent fuel produced in non-nuclear-weapons
states if we are to convince them that we want to make certain that
they take a share of it and we are left with a fair share of it.
Last, . .. I simply say that, under certain circumstances, assistance to
another country with regard to spent fuel can provide a significant
incentive to accept effective nonproliferation controls by providing
additional time for the development of secure nuclear cycle facilities, especially international storage. 2 7
Storage for spent fuel eliminates the need to reprocess spent fuel
stemming from a lack of storage capacity. Additionally, guaranteeing
a supply of nuclear fuel equivalent to the value of a nation's recycled
24. 22 U.S.C. § 3223.
25. 124 CONG. REC. S 1, 318 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (letter to Sen. Hollings from
Sen. Glenn).
26. 124 CONG. REC. S 1, 064 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Glenn).
27. 124 CONG. REC. S 1, 064 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Percy).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

spent fuel renders reprocessing less desirable. Two parts of this plan
present difficulties. Problems arise in connection with the concept of
"international auspices" and calculating "appropriate compensation
for the energy content of ... spent fuel."

A. InternationalAuspices
As discussed above, the term international auspices is a vague one,
but can be understood to mean international, rather than national,
control of the functions of the AFR storage facility. Presumably, international control will serve to insulate the international facility
from the political influences of the host nation-in this case the U.S.
A high level of sovereign immunity afforded an international organization operating the international AFR storage facility would ameliorate most foreign objections to U.S. influence over the facility. Participation in ownership and decison making by participants is vital to
the political acceptability of any such scheme.2 8
An institutional arrangement which will be acceptable to foreign
participants should include two principal features: (1) separation of
ownership and control which is necessary if governments, at the
political level, are to be kept out of day-to-day management to a
reasonable extent; and (2) a pool of capital subject to the control of
the enterprise. The capability of any one nation to withhold its capital or operating contribution probably would result in undue influence on the facility's operation.2 9
Participating nations face one essential risk: seizure of their spent
fuel by the U.S. while it is in storage. A properly drawn charter for
such an international organization could mandate that seizure would
constitute both a violation of international law (treaty abrogation)
and grounds for demanding return of the spent fuel. In essence, the
U.S. may be forced to acquiesce to participating nations requesting
the return of spent fuel. The U.S., however, could maintain its prior
approval rights over retransfer of the spent fuel once back in the participant's domain.
Unlike more complicated endeavors, such as the operation of international reprocessing or enrichment facilities, an international
AFR storage facility would involve few critical decisions beyond the
particular disposition of spent fuel in storage. If the establishing charter were to specify the manner and method for storage with well defined criteria for release of stored spent fuel, the operational deci28. A. CHAYES and W. LEWIS, INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING 146 (1977).
29. Id. at 150.
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sions which could adversely affect the interests of the participants
would be minimized.
B. Appropriate Compensationfor Energy Content
Providing compensation for the energy content of spent fuel would
encourage foreign nations to participate in international storage plans
and discourage them from reprocessing their own spent fuel for recycling. Providing economic compensation through payments or
credits toward new fuel presumably would reduce the incentives
prompting indigenous reprocessing. Two difficulties arise in connection with the concept of compensation as framed in NNPA. The first
problem involves the phrase "if recovery of such energy content is
deemed necessary or desirable." The second involves establishing the
value of the "energy content" in spent fuel.
Many nations engaged in nuclear activities regard the NNPA as an
American law designed to inhibit the growth of reprocessing and
other advanced fuel cycle technologies and thus preclude nuclear
weapons proliferation which potentially could stem from these technologies. Many nations also view NNPA as an intrusion on their sovereign power to decide how to supply energy to their industry and
residents.3 0 The attractiveness of fuel cycle alternatives will vary
from one nation to another. Thus, many nations probably could not
agree to leave decisions concerning the necessity or desirability of reprocessing to another nation. Participants in an international AFR
storage facility could be attracted by U.S. acquiescence to independent determinations of the desirability or necessity of recovery. Specifically, the charter establishing the organization could invest the
power to make that choice in participants with little likelihood of increasing proliferation risks if the alternative is more immediate commercial or indigenous reprocessing. If a participant finds such compensation desirable or necessary, then the U.S., pursuant to NNPA,
could supply low enriched fuel of the same energy value as the reprocessed spent fuel in storage. The U.S. could then take title to foreign spent fuel for future use. Those nations likely to request appropriate compensation probably will be those expecting to forego fast
plutonium breeders, since those nations would receive nuclear fuel
useful only in an LWR fuel cycle. Presumably, those nations which
may pursue fast breeders would want to reprocess spent nuclear fuel
to recover plutonium, which is necessary for operating fuel breeders.
This regime would be particularly useful to the U.S. if commercial
30. India Claims UnilateralRight to Reprocess US.-Origin Fuel, Nucleonics Week, Dec.
18, 1980, at 2.
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breeder reactors were developed domestically. Appropriate compensation could also include financial credits, fossil fuels, or alternative
energy technologies if all parties agree.
Establishing an appropriate value for spent fuel energy content,
however, may prove very difficult. In a simple sense, the net value of
the energy content in spent fuel equals the gross value of uranium
and plutonium in the spent fuel minus the cost of extracting this
material and converting it to new reactor fuel. Hence, the net value
of spent fuel energy content equals the cost of an equivalent value of
uranium LWR fuel minus the excess costs of reprocessing and fuel
fabrication plus the savings in yellow cake (processed uranium ore)
and enrichment services.3
In negotiations regarding the valuation of spent fuel, opinions may
vary widely regarding the fuel
cycle parameters which would dictate
"appropriate compensation." 3 2 Different fuel cycle plans affect the
price of nuclear fuel significantly. For example, if a nation plans
large-scale breeder development, then the "energy content" of plutonium may be far greater than if breeders are not planned. Further,
negotiators may disagree about the costs of storing, safeguarding,
transporting, and reprocessing spent fuel and as to the price of yellow
cake and enrichment services. There may be disagreement about
leases, bailment, exchange, or buyback provisions, the value of uranium in spent fuel, and accounting methods reflecting those differing
values. Analyses have indicated that the value of spent fuel is highly
sensitive to uncertainty in a number of relevant factors. Reaching an
early agreement on "appropriate compensation" may be very difficult. Negotiations aimed at establishing an international AFR storage
facility pursuant to NNPA therefore require a realistic appraisal of
these difficulties. 3
C. Sovereign Immunity
International arrangements involving the nuclear energy fuel cycle
should serve to reduce the influence of international politics on the
assurance of nuclear fuel supplies. In the case of an international AFR
storage facility, participating nations will want to maintain some degree of direct control over spent fuel stored at the facility. If the
facility is located in the U.S., some guarantee of access and control
by foreign nations must be maintained. The concept of sovereign immunity would guarantee such access. Sovereign immunity would also
31. SOLOMON AND TRIPLETT, A PROCEDURE FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR SPENT
FUEL VALUATION 11-13 (RAND/P-6240, November 1978).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 33-34.
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remove the international organization and agents of foreign governments associated with it from the jurisdiction of national laws.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is essentially a judicial concept. Traditionally, the doctrine dictates that the courts of one country refuse to accept jurisdiction over another government's sovereign.
The U.S. courts have followed this custom. The rationale underlying
the doctrine of sovereign immunity combines the notions of quid pro
quo, a carryover of the divine right of kings, and a sense that legal
disputes frequently entail larger political issues, including matters
affecting each country's foreign relations in general.' I Sovereign immunity would apply, however, only to cases involving the official
actions of the controlling organization and its agents.
The problem of delineating proper limits to immunity for the international organization and its agents while maintaining adequate
protection of foreign interests in stored spent fuel may be difficult.
If the international AFR storage facility is considered an international
organization (as declared by executive order), then the International
Organization Immunities Act 3" (IOIA) will determine the limits of
3
immunity. Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 6
cited by some as the ruling legislation, primarily in response to commercial foreign governments functioning in the U.S. Examples of
such activities include India's government owned and operated banks,
Brazil's nationally owned steamship company, Mexico's government
operated petroleum industry, and Italy's nationally owned and operated airline. 3 The Diplomatic Relations Act 3 I is aimed solely at defining the duties and liabilities of agents of foreign nations. Nations
have been defined as "[entities] which [have] a defined permanent
population under the control of a government, and which engages in
formal relations with other such countries."3' " In contrast, international organizations are created by international agreement. Memberships in such organizations consist primarily of nations.4 o More importantly, nations possess the totality of international rights and
duties recognized by international law; the rights and duties of international organizations, however, depend upon each organization's
34. Roth, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 2 THE CORP. L. REV. 335
(Fall 1979).
35. 22 U.S.C. § § 288(a)-(f) (1976).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
37. Roth, supra note 34, at 334.
38. 22 U.S.C. § § 254(a)-(e) (Supp. 11 1978); 28 U.S.C. § § 1251, 1351, 1364 (Supp.
111978).
39. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Tentative Draft No. 2 § 201 (1981).
40. Id. § 201 at 5.
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purposes and functions as specified in its charter and related documents. 4 1

Courts have interpreted IOIA as a codification, rather than as the
origin, of America's obligation to provide organizations designated
under IOIA with immunities consistent with the organization's charter.4 2 Most international organizations provide in their charters for
immunity from legal processes. A charter, accepted by a host nation,
creates the real authority for sovereign immunity.4 Therefore, the
charter establishing the international organization with control over
an international AFR storage facility will specifically address the organization's level of sovereign immunity.
An individual nation bases its grant of sovereign immunity on
comity and sovereign equality, while an international organization
bases its grant on the need to discharge its responsibilities. There are
three general arguments put forth in the literature favoring nearly absolute immunity for international organizations.
1. International organizations are democratically constituted international bodies in which all member nations and their interests
are represented and, therefore, should be protected from interference by any single nation.
2. An international organization's assets derive from common national resources. No single country should realize a financial advantage by levying a charge on those resources.
3. International organizations should receive, at a minimum, the immunities afforded between nations.4 4
The type of immunity which applies to most international organizations, including the proposed international AFR storage facility,
follows the concept of functional immunity. 4 1 Inherent in this concept is the tenet that international organizations may define and interpret the scope of their privileges and immunities without outside
interference.4 6
The United Nations (UN) Charter and the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter 4 1 present two good examples of func41. Sovereign Immunity and International Organizations: Broadbent v. OAS, 13 J.
INT'L. L. & ECON. 679-80 (1979).
42. United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
43. Supra note 41, at 651.
44. C. JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 17 (1961).
45. This is distinct from absolute or restrictive immunity; see J. O'BRIEN, INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH A DOMESTICALLY SITED MULTINATIONAL
FUEL CYCLE FACILITY 24 (NUREG/CR-1028, December 7, 1979).
46. D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 308 (3rd Ed.
1975).
47. Supra note 41, at 686-87.
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tional immunity for international organizations operating in the U.S.
Article 105(3) of the UN charter provides "such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes" and further
empowers the UN General Assembly to establish specific privileges
and immunities. The UN General Assembly adopted the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,4 8 which
specifies that "the United Nations, its property and assets, wherever
located and by whomever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form
of legal process except insofar as in any case it has expressly waived
its immunity." Article 139 of the OAS charter 4 9 and the Agreement
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American
States' 0 contains language nearly identical to that in the UN Charter
and Convention.
The commercial nature of the services an international storage
facility will provide (storage of excess spent reactor fuel) may dictate
that the level of immunity granted the controlling organization
should be somewhat more restricted than for those organizations of a
more purely political nature. The concept of functional immunity
for personal acts is conditional on the immunity of the particular international organization in that its agents must accept primary responsibility for the legal effects of their acts if not performed directly
as an agent for the international organization.' I To ensure that immunity is not abused, most international organizations have established procedures for impartial adjudication of questions concerning
fault and remedies for aggrieved parties.' 2 In addition, the President
retains the right to revoke by executive order IOIA coverage of any
organization he feels has abused its immunities. 5 3 Accordingly, the
charter establishing the international AFR storage facility could include a commitment to return all spent fuel to all nations if such immunities are revoked and participating nations agree to receive the
spent fuel.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 which is aimed primarily
at foreign commercial enterprise within the U.S., mandates that the
assets of a foreign nation held by an international organization are
immune from "any action brought in the courts of the United States
48. 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (February 13, 1946).
49. 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (April 30, 1948); ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 721 U.N.T.S. 264
(February 27, 1967).
50. Pan-Am T.S. No. 22, 1(3) Ann. OAS 271 (1949).
51. Supra note 41, at 689.
52. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER (1948), art. 12
[19511 2 (2) U.S.T. 2416.
53. 22 U.S.C. § 288(a) (1976).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1976).
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or of the States." This means that in a suit involving a foreign government's commercial activity in the U.S., those assets subject to the
charter of an international organization cannot be seized. In other
words, spent fuel deposited in an international AFR storage facility
will be automatically immune from any legal action brought against
any participating nation.' I Litigation which has arisen from claims
against international organizations indicates that a high level of immunity can be anticipated for an international AFR storage facility. 6
D. Characteristicsof InternationalOrganizations
The literature describing potential international arrangements in
the field of nuclear energy commerce raises various questions regarding the structure and legal status of international organizations.5 ' An
examination of the history of international cooperation through institutional arrangements provides guidance in selecting and establishing the structure with the greatest potential for success.
Most literature addressing the establishment of international cooperative arrangements concerning the nuclear fuel cycle refers to the
present paucity of such arrangements. Numerous examples of successful international cooperative arrangements, however, exist in
fields somewhat related to an endeavor like nuclear commerce.5 8
This section will detail various options which have evolved in those
fields.
1. Classifications
There are a variety of classes of international organizations. These
classes differentiate the organization's powers and responsibilities and
are generally derived from the original purpose of the organization.
55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6614.
56. See Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 206 (1947); Herbert Harvey, Inc. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Edison Sault Electric Co. v. United States, 552 F.2d
326 (Ct. CL 1977); Weidner v. INTELSAT, 392 A.2d 508 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978).
57. BURNS and ROE, INTERNATIONAL FUEL SERVICES CENTERS (DOE Contract No. EN-77-C-01-5066, August 1978); REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTERS, IAEA (STI/PUB/445, 1977); W. R. HARRIS, NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY AND
NUCLEAR TRADE: INTERNATIONAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES (RAND-P-5792, 1977); ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING AND COMMERCIALIZING BREEDER REACTOR
TECHNOLOGY (RAND-PB-263479, 1976); M. B. KRATZER and E. F. WONDER, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REDUCTION OF PROLIFERATION RISKS,
INT'L ENERGY ASSOC. LTD. (1979); H. MENDERSHAUSEN, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES (RAND-P-6308, December 1978).
58. For example, international cooperation in trade, mail distribution, radio communications, labor relations, economics, etc.
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There are four ranges of characteristics that describe an international
organization: public versus private, universal versus regional, supranational versus intergovernmental, and general versus functional.
An international organization must satisfy three requirements to
be classified as public, and hence to become eligible for privileges and
immunities under the International Organization Immunities Act.' I
The organization must: (1) be established by international agreement,
(2) operate through organs, and (3) be established under international
law. 6" The President then can grant public status by executive order.
The funding arrangements for an international organization must
take the form of an agreement between nations. The usual form of
such agreements is a multilateral treaty. Some international organizations have been founded simply on the decision of representatives of
nations assembled in conference, but this method is not widely recognized or used. 6 1 The international agreement also serves to establish the separate and discrete legal personality of the new organization. Its legal personality may be completely independent or part of
another organization, e.g., the UN family of international organizations. Lastly, the agreement contains mutual commitments by participating nations requiring a certain amount of cooperation within, and
with, the organization. The network of commitments in an agreement are comprehensive in that a nation cannot withdraw selectively
from certain obligations. All participants must accept the disadvantages as well as the advantages of membership.
The nature of an international agreement is potentially very broad.
Although the term "treaty" normally refers to an international agreement which requires approval of a two-thirds majority of the Senate,
an executive agreement can be employed to achieve the same ends.
International executive agreements generally fall into the following
three categories: (1) agreements or understandings entered into pursuant to or in accordance with specific legislation, (2) those not given
effect without subsequent congressional approval, and (3) those
made by the Executive solely on the basis of constitutional powers.
An executive agreement for the formation of an international AFR
storage facility would most probably be of the second type. This is
because NNPA specifically stipulates in Sec. 104(f) that no binding
international agreement may be negotiated until it is approved by
concurrent resolution of Congress. This section recognizes that such
59. See supra notes 35-42 and related text.
60. H. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (1972) [hereinafter SCHERMERS].
61. The official UN approach dictates that an international agreement is required,
ECOSOC Resolutions 288B(X) and 1296(XLIV) on Non-Governmental Organizations.
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an undertaking could be concluded by the Executive in absence of
further congressional guidance and seeks to mitigate that possibility.
This route may be more likely than negotiations for an actual treaty
because a concurrent resolution of Congress is probably easier to
attain than a two-thirds majority of the Senate.
An international organization can function only if it has organs
formed by delegates of two or more nations and is not dependent on
any one nation. 62 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was orginally an agreement between nations without organs.
The organization behind GATT therefore was denied public international status.6 3 Gradually, decision-making organs were formed, starting with a Council of Representatives. Status as a public international
organization was granted subsequently.6 4
The existence of an international agreement generally satisfies the
final condition requiring that international organizations be established under international, rather than national, law. Unless the agreement specifically subjects the organization to national law, the organization is subject to international law. 6 s
Private international organizations are always subject to the law of
the nation in which the organization was established. Thus, if an international spent fuel storage organization originated as a private
international organization, it would not be eligible for status as an
international organization under the 1OIA.
The universal/regional distinction focuses on an organizations
scope. Universality connotes operation on a global scale and access
for all nations wishing to participate. 66 Regionalism may involve organization along geographic, economic, cultural, or political lines.
A global solution to the problem of spent fuel congestion requires
an organization with the attributes of universality. Broad participation would minimize the effectiveness of non-members who might
band together to thwart the purpose of the organization. Universality,
however, necessitates setting less stringent conditions for membership. 6 7
Various influences shape regional organizations. Usually the
62. Syersted, Objective InternationalPersonality of Intergovernmental Organizations,
34 NOR DISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 47 (1964).
63. Dam, The GATT as an International Organization, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 374
(1969).
64. Id.
65. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 11.
66. This was the concept used by the International Law Commission of the UN in the
Draft Articles on Representatives of States to International Organizqaions, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 9) 4, U.N. Doc. A/7209/Rev. 1.
67. McDougal and Goodman, Qzinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal
Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution, 60 AM. J. INT'L. L. 671, 682-83 (1966).
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reasons prompting regional cooperation include the threat of outside
influence and a desire to combine common interests. Nations with
comparable political systems and compatible cultural and economic
backgrounds generally form regional organization. The homogeneity
of participants in regional organizations influences a nation's willingness to transfer power to a regional organization. 6 I
Intergovernmental organizations are generally thought of as international organizations composed of and operated by the executive
branches of national governments. Supranational organizations involve the legislative and judicial branches of participant governments.
Two main attributes characterize intergovernmental organizations:
decision-making power lies with the delegates of the members, and
nations cannot be bound by the organization against their will. An
ideal supranational agreement would provide that the decisions of
the international organization bind all members, that the organs are
not entirely dependent on national governments, and that the organization must have enforcement powers and some financial autonomy,
and that unilateral withdrawal is not possible. 6"
Of course, no truly supranational organization exists at present. As
more of the above conditions are included in international agreements, however, organizations will become more supranational in
character. Some degree of supranationality may prove desirable in
view of the nature of an international AFR storage scheme.
Most international organizations have been established to perform
a specific function. For example, the Universal Postal Organization
(UPO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) were founded to
facilitate development of postal communications and to improve
health, respectively. The UPO and WHO are, therefore, functional organizations. Functional organizations are sometimes referred to as
"technical" organizations, as well.
Political disputes rarely plague functional organizations. This observation, however, appears less accurate when even the recognition
of participants involves political considerations, as in the case of
China and South Africa. Some organizations avoid political questions
as a rule. The Universal Postal Union, for example, decided at one
time to exclude practically all questions of a political nature from
their debates.7 0
General organizations are characterized by the vast nature of the
fields they cover. Delegates usually strive to attain political goals. The
68. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 18.
69. Id. at 19-24.
70. Universal Postal Union Resolution C4, reprinted in [1969] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B.
at 119-20.
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most important general organizations are the UN, the Council of
Europe, the Organization of American States, and the Organization
of African Unity.
It is impossible to make a sharp distinction between functional and
general organizations. General organizations eventually become functional through excluding large fields from their operations. Conversely, functional organizations charged with important cooperative
tasks become more general in character.' 1
2. Participants
Three types of membership are generally available in international
organizations: full membership with full rights to participation, associate membership with the right to participate without voting rights,
and parttime membership with the right to participate in some activities only. Often some members participate as consultants. Membership differences loom large in a nation's perception of its influence
on decision making. Some members contribute more financially than
others. Some may hold privileged positions such as of permanent
membership in subsidiary organs. Some have the right to exercise a
veto power. The character of rights and obligations belonging to certain members can influence strongly the direction and development
of an organization. 2
Once an international organization has been established, new members are admitted under either a constitutional provision or a constitutional amendment. If a constitutional amendment is required, admission can generally be made only by a unanimous decision of all
members. The constitutions (or charters) of some international organizations make membership available to all nations, or to the nations
of a particular group. If the constitution dictates conditions for membership, then the organization should contain a judicial organ to assure that standards for membership are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. 7 ' Some organizations expressly leave the question of
admission open to criteria to be determined on a case by case basis.7 4
Admission generally should be approved by a simple majority vote if
an organization wishes to acquire the traits of universality. 7 Most
71. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 25.
72. For example, the United Nations Security Council members' veto rights.
73. This is the case in both the UN and the European Communities.
74. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
art. 2 § 2 [hereinafter I.M.F. CONST.]; GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, art. 33; EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASS'N, art. 41.
75. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, art. 6; ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN
UNITY, art. 28.
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7
universal organizations, however, require a two-thirds majority. 6
Most regional organizations require a unanimous decision.' '
A member generally can withdraw under the constitution of an in-

ternational organization." I Withdrawal usually requires previous
notice followed by a period of time allowing the organization to
adapt to the withdrawal. The time period is generally one year, but
may be longer. The general rule seems to be that the notice period
should include two meetings of the organization's main plenary
organ. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires a oneyear period for withdrawal from treaties.7" Some constitutions prohibit withdrawal for a certain initial period. 8 0 Nonpayment of financial contributions amounts to withdrawal in some international
organizations. 8
8
Some constitutions do not contain provisions for withdrawal,

2

while others include such provisions to enhance their political acceptability.8 1 In practice, nations have withdrawn regardless of constitutional provisions. 8
Thus, some organizations, such as the World
Health Organization, have implemented procedures for designating
withdrawn nations as "inactive." The organization levies a small assessment on the inactive nation, thus allowing a nation to "rejoin"
with less difficulty. 8 s The Vienna Convention on Treaties permits
unilateral withdrawal from any international organization in the case
76. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 39.
77. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art. 237; EURATOM, Art. 205, NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, art. 10.
78. Joyner, The United States' Withdrawal from the ILO: International Politics in the
Labor Arena, 12 INT'L LAW. 728 (Fall 1978) [hereinafter Joyner].
7. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, art. 56 [hereinafter
VIENNA CONV.1.
80. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 1956, art.
18D, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873 [hereinafter I.A.E.A. CONST.] (5 years); CONSTITUTION OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945, art. 19, 60 Stat. 1886, T.I.A.S. No. 1554 [hereinafter F.A.O. CONST.] (4
years); INT'L CIVIC AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, art. 95 (3 years); CONVENTION OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, 1948,
art. 59, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044 (1 year); and NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, 1949,
art. 13, 63 Stat 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964 (20 years).
81. CENTRAL OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY TRANSPORT, art. 2,
para. 2, 242 U.N.T.S. p. 325; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LEGAL METROLOGY, art. 29, CONVENTION ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
OF LEGAL METROLOGY, 1955, art. 29, 23 U.S.T. 4249, T.I.A.S. No. 7533.
82. For example, the UN, World Health Organization and European Communities constitutions do not.
83. See L. GOODRICH AND E. HAMBRO, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 74-76 (3d ed. 1969).
84. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 50.
85. OFFICIAL RECORDS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, NO. 71, 19 (May 11,
1956).
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of a fundamental change in circumstances 6 In order to complement
this provision, some organizations provide legal remedies for an
organ's failure to perform as originally intended, thereby partially
mitigating damage resulting from such fundamental changes.' 7
The U.S. has exercised the right of withdrawal in the case of the
International Labour Organization (ILO). In 1970, a Soviet national
was nominated, without U.S. consultation, to the position of Assistant Director-General. Congress considered this act a direct affront to
the U.S. and eliminated funding for the ILO in its fiscal year 1971
appropriations. In 1975, the ILO granted the Palestinian Liberation
Organization observer status and simultaneously voted down a proIsraeli resolution sponsored by the U.S. Again Congress withheld
funding for 1975 and 1976-a total of $22.3 million-and the U.S.
seriously considered withdrawal.8 8
Later in 1975, the U.S. gave the ILO formal notice that it would
withdraw after the mandatory two-year waiting period stipulated in
the ILO charter. The U.S. indicated that it would use the two years
for initiatives that would ameliorate the conditions which made continued U.S. participation impossible. Specifically, the U.S. objected
to communist participation in the organization since the communist
delegations did not distinguish between the government and labor. In
1977 the U.S. terminated its membership in the ILO citing insufficient progress towards its goals.8 9
International organizations can expel or suspend members in certain circumstances. Expulsion and suspension differ little, even
though suspension normally connotes only a temporary expulsion. 9 0
Organizations rarely use expulsion as a sanction because generally expulsion only serves to lessen the influence of the organization over a
troublesome nation. Most organizations consider the presence of a
troublesome nation during debates concerning that nation's interests
essential to the accomplishment of the organization's purpose. 9 ' Expulsion on the other hand, provides a means of removing a member
who has taken obstructionist positions or who no longer qualifies
under the organization's constitution.9 2 In most regional organiza86. VIENNA CONV., supra note 79, art. 62.
87. See, e.g., the discussion of the Dairy Products case (judgment No. 91 and 91 heard
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Nov. 13, 1964) in BRINKHORST
AND H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1213(1969).
88. Joyner, supra note 78, at 726.
89. Id. at 731-34.
90. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 54-55.
91. Id.
92. Jenks, Expulsion from the League of Nations, 16 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 156 (1935);
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 16, para. 4.
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tions, a common political attitude forms the core of activities. If a
member changes its political system, the necessity for expulsion may
outweigh the disadvantages of operating as a smaller forum. 9 I
Many constitutions of international organizations contain provisions for expulsion. 9 The same voting procedure that governs any
important plenary decision also governs the decision to expel. Some
constitutions provide that cooperation is a necessary characteristic of
its members and that noncooperation will justify expulsion. 9"
Some organizations allow associate memberships. Such membership is, in large part, a historical legacy from the days when nonautonomous territories had the right to participate without a vote. 9 6 As
the number of non-autonomous territories has decreased, the use of
associate membership has declined. Members of some organizations
serve only on certain organs and are, therefore, considered partial
members sharing only certain duties and obligations. 9 ' At times,
nonmember states, public and private international organizations,
and individuals are asked to participate in debates. They are normally
referred to as consultants in that capacity. 9 8
3. General Structure and Rules of Operation
All international organizations function through a principal organ
in which all members are represented. The number of parties in each
nation's delegation is usually not regulated and is usually proportional to the particular importance of the organization's activities to
any single nation.
Members cannot carry out the business and administration of an
international organization. Effective functioning depends on the formation of organs in which members can meet and make decisions. A
completely separate operational organ may be desirable in some cases.
In a spent fuel storage facility, most decisions would be inconsequential from a policy standpoint. Decisions which are completely managerial in nature can be left to a technical organ in which a diversity of
viewpoints is not considered essential. For spent fuel storage, these
decisions may involve fuel deposition, accounting methods, physical
93. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 56.
94. I.M.F. CONST., supra note 74, art. 15 § 2; ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, art. 6, § 2,
60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502.
95. For example, Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
96. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 1946, art. 8, 62
Stat 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808 [hereinafter W.H.O. CONST.1; F.A.O. CONST., supra note
80, art. 3.
97. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 182-92.
98. Id. at 72-81.
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security, personnel clearances, and criticality concerns. Important decisions should result from a concensus reached by members in larger,
broader discussion and conducted through the larger principle organ.
Historically, small, nonplenary or "technical" organs consist of members with the greatest expertise and the most at stake. 9 9 Organs are
usually led by a director or director-general.
a. Secretariat
The proper functioning of an international organization requires
some organ for accomplishing administrative tasks. The name "secretariat" originated in the negotiations of the League of Nations and
was chosen as an accurate designation of the administrative and secondary nature of its functions. Some secretariats do not head any
particular organ. Instead, they oversee a broad level of activity. The
power and authority of secretariats vary from organization to organization.' o o
The secretariat normally handles all administrative matters, including those of policy concerning administration (i.e., travel, living
expenses, supplying or withholding of administrative services). The
secretariat generally prepares the budget, proposes new programs,
and oversees disbursement of funds. The secretariat can normally
serve as a conduit for information, as record keeper, as coordinator,
as the representative in legal proceedings, and as a depository of
treaties. Also, the secretariat can exercise the right of initiative, act as
mediator, and is at times charged with executive functions in specialized organs.' 01
The secretariat normally exerts great influence in technial organizations because of its expert knowledge. Such influence could well
be a desirable characteristic in an organization for spent fuel management. The secretariat's capacity to delegate very technical matters to
an outside consultant may also be a desirable feature in a plan for
managing spent fuel.
The "seat" of the organization is generally held to be where the
secretariat resides. The secretariat need not be located at the center
of activity unless direct supervision is necessary. The selection and
establishment of the location for an organization's seat involves
many considerations, including the consent of a host nation, demographics, regional politics, communications, language, and the suffi99. Manno, Problems and Trends in the Composition of Nonplenary UN Organs, 19
INT'L ORGANIZATION 37 (1965).
100. For example, the UN and International Labor Office.
101. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 182-92.
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ciency of physical plant. Some international organizations have estab-

lished decentralized secretariats to handle some matters on a regional
and somewhat autonomous basis.' 0 2
A body of international civil servants serves international organiza-

tions. As a rule, the secretariat of the organization appoints international civil servants while the major plenary organ,' 0 3 the board,' 0 4
or both' 0 5 elect the secretary-general, assistant secretaries general,
and directors-general. International civil servants for a secretariat
need not always be picked on the basis of geography. Some constitu0 6
Such strict
tions, however, mandate selection based on geography.'
allocation of positions in the secretariat can be counterproductive because the most capable personnel may not be selected, there is reduced power because of continued recruitment outside the secretar-

iat, and nations are usually consulted before selections are made
official in any event. 07 Recruitment of nonmember nationals is very
rare. Equitable geographic distribution may be appropriate for professional and senior posts, but lower grade employees are usually re-

cruited locally for economic reasons.
The conditions of employment for international civil servants have

been harmonized among various international organizations. Grades,
remuneration, permanent or temporary status, and internships have
been standardized to prevent gross discrepancies and interorganizational competition for the best employees.' 08
b. Major Plenary Organ
The major plenary organ consists of all members of the organization. This body is sometimes called the general assembly, congress,

parliamentary organ, and so on. The major plenary organ exercises
control over the executive, budget, and advisory functions, and over
all major policy decisions. Voting is sometimes weighted by requiring

a certain majority or unanimity, or by varying the number of votes
102. The World Health Organization, the UN, and the International Labour Organization all have regional offices in the Secretaries.
103. For example, F.A.O. CONST., supra note 80, art. 7; CONVENTION OF THE
METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, 1947, art. 21, 1 U.S.T. 281, T.I.A.S. No. 2052.
104. For example, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONSTITUTION
(Annex), 1946, art. 8, 62 Stat 3490; I.M.F. CONST., supra note 74, art. 12, § 4.
105. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 97 [hereinafter U.N. CONST.];
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, 1946, art. 6, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 1580, I.A.E.A. CONST.,
supra note 80, art. 7.
106. U.N. CONST., supra note 105, art. 101; F.A.O. CONST., supra note 80, art. 8,
para. 3; W.H.O. CONST., supra note 96, art. 35.
107. See JACKSON REPORT, UN Doc. DP/5, Vol. II, at 345-50.
108. See UN Doc. A/5599, at 13.
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per member. As stated previously, regional organizations often require unamimous votes on matters of importance. Others require
some fraction of unamity, usually two-thirds or three-quarters to pass
important resolutions. In some organizations, votes are weighted according to financial contributions. Many weighted voting systems
also allocate "basic" votes to nations without great financial or technical influence in order to prevent domination of the body by one or
two nations.' 0 9

c. The Major Plenary Board
For the most part, international organizations do not make decisions in general assembly. Instead, a board representing the major elements of the organization and usually responsible only to the major
plenary organ convenes to make decisions. The board's composition
usually reflects the major policy position among the membership and
a broad spectrum of national concerns.' 1 0
The board of an international AFR storage facility could be structured during negotiations to reflect the concerns of members. Negotiators could mold the board's composition, voting requirements, and
authority to serve member interests.
d. Judicial Organs
(1) Functions
Only a judicial organ empowered to interpret an organization's
constitution can insure control over the functions of an international
organization. This is especially true for supranational organizations.
Many nations may agree to transfer some sovereign power to an international organization if there exists some assurance that constitutional restrictions on that power would not be abused. 1'
The voting procedure used in the decision making process will influence the need for judicial organs. When a unanimous vote is required for major actions, clearly no court need be involved. If an
organization's constitution requires a majority and/or weighted
voting, the possibility of discriminatory decision making is stronger.
Judicial review is available, in most international organizations, to
settle disputes between a staff member and the organization which
employs him. Such review is not generally available in-house, but
rather, since most international organizations have similar staff/orga109. For example, the International Monetary Fund.
110. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 241-44.
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nization relationships, through the judicial organ of another organization.'

12

Many times an international organization's legal rules must comport with the laws of member nations. Usually, such rules are laid
down in conventions and require separate ratification by the members. These rules achieve uniformity between the organizational and
national legal provisions necessary for pursuing the aims of the organization.' 1 ' The decisions of judicial organizations are only as binding as the constitution allows and, in a practical sense, to the extent
that a member accepts and respects them.
Disputes over the functioning of the organization and disputes concerning matters not directly related to the function of the organization comprise the two types of conflict that may arise between members of an international organization. Generally, neither of these two
kinds of disputes surface as litigation. The general plenary body can
resolve disputes over the operation of the organization. Any other
dispute is brought to the International Court of Justice or submitted
to international arbitration.' 1 4

Disputes arising over a matter of national law (i.e., purchase of
goods and services under the law of a host nation) are rarely settled
in an international court. Most of the contracts used for such purposes contain a waiver of immunity concerning the purchase. Where
no waiver is included, a contract usually includes an obligation to
accept arbitration and thus eliminates the need for a special judicial
organ.' I

(2) Composition
As a rule, judicial organs consist of an odd number of justices,
usually fewer than eight. These judicial bodies are usually larger than
national courts to reflect the diversity of national legal systems
affected by their decisions. Some organizations' constitutions require
an equitable geographic distribution of justices. Others mandate that
a national from each side of the dispute be on the bench.' 1 6
Provisions for appointing justices are aimed at maximizing the independence of the appointees. As a rule, the major plenary organ ap112.
113.
114.
115.
1970).
116.
Rights.

Id.
Id.
Id.
D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 305 (2d ed.
For example, the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
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proves the appointment before it is effective. In some organizations,
lots for final appointments are drawn from national nominations to
promote the independence of the court.' 1 7 Independence has been
sought through many means, including long-term appointments, minimizing individual state influence in elections, and keeping secret the
personal opinions of each justice.' 18
Some organizations have adopted the use of advocates general,' 19
who present publicly, with impartiality and independence, reasoned
conclusions on matters before the court. The use of advocates-general
is not widespread, however.
(3) Examples
(a) International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was originally an organ of
the League of Nations. The UN adopted ICJ as one of its principal
organs. ' ° The ICJ functions mainly as a forum for the settlement
of disputes between nations. Members and nonmembers of the UN
appear as parties to disputes before the ICJ. 21 The ICJ, however,
cannot always summon a nation before it. The nation must first accept the ICJ as the forum for settlement or recognize ICJ jurisdiction.'

22

Virtually all UN organizations may ask the ICJ for advisory opinions, but such opinions have no binding force and are not available to
members or individuals.' 2 3 Some organizations hold advisory opinions to be binding.'

24

(b) The Court of Justice of the European Communities
The Court of Justice is the world's most supranational international court. The Court of Justice renders decisions in disputes between members,' 25 determines the legality of Community Acts,' 26
117. For example, the Western European Indian.
118. SCHERMERS, supra note 60, at 263.
119. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art. 166; EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY, art. 32, EURATOM, art. 138.
120. U.N. CHARTER, art. 7, para. 1.
121. Id., art. 93.
122. INTERNATIOAL COURT OF JUSTICE STATUTE, art. 36.
123. See K. KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1971).
124. See, e.g, ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, art. 13 (2).
125. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art. 170; EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY, art. 80, EURATOM art. 142.
126. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, arts. 173, 175,184; EUROPEAN STEEL
COMMUNITY, arts. 33, 35, 36; EURATOM, arts. 146, 148, 156.
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and functions as an administrative tribunal for the staff of the Communities.' 2 7 The Court rules in arbitration proceedings brought
under contracts containing no waiver clause.' 2 ' On appeal, the Court
may hear disputes concerning licenses granted by Euratom.' 29
The Court of Justice can rule on the compatibility of bilateral
agreements, both within and without the European Communities,
with the constitution of the Communities.' 30 The Court of Justice
also can rule on whether a member's acts comply with rules and regulations promulgated by the Community.' '
4. Reservations, Arbitration, and Sanctions
Any international organization which can alter the balance of interests between nations will often encounter objections to its actions.
When a nation wishes to join an international organization, that nation
may object to certain provisions of the organization's constitution by
declaring a reservation when accepting membership. The acceptability and authority of reservations can vary extensively. Disputes may
necessitate arbitration proceedings for clarifying legal questions and
defining interests at stake. International organizations rely on arbitration frequently, and procedural and substantive practices have developed. Ultimately, when an organization has power it must be able to
levy sanctions when violations occur and the offending nation should
be penalized for its actions.
a. Reservations
A reservation is defined as "a unilateral statement, however phrased
or named, made by a State [nation], when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect' of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State."' 32
A reservation is a unilateral declaration, made outside the treaty. A
statement which is explanatory or merely a declaration of intent,
however, is not a reservation unless it results in a variation in the legal
effect of the treaty for the reserving nation. Since consent is the basis
of treaty power, the underlying validity of a reservation lies in the
consent of other member nations. A member nation may consent to
a reservation tacitly, impliedly, or expressly. A member nation may
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, art. 179.
Id., art. 183; EURATOM, art. 155.
EURATOM, art. 18.
For example, EURATOM, art. 103.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, art. 172.
VIENNA CONV., supra note 19, art. 2(d).
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consent either at the time the reservation is formulated, or in advance,
when the reservation is drafted in accordance with a specific reservations clause in the organization's constitution. When one nation accepts the reservation of another, a reciprocal agreement exists between the reserving and the accepting nations. This agreement does
not alter, however, the relationship of an accepting nation with other
nonaccepting nations. Such agreements can result in a multiplicity of
levels of participation in an international cooperative endeavor.' 3 3
Reservations can be classified as either reciprocal or normative depending on their impact. A reciprocal reservation is appropriate in
most circumstances since it affects only the nations involved and not
third party nations. Normative provisions, conversely, operate for the
reserving nation in relation to all, rather than any particular, party
nations.' 34
The General Assembly of the UN, recognizing the crucial role that
reservations play in the formation and interpretation of international
law, made the following recommendations at its sixth session:
That organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies and States
should, in the course of preparing multilateral conventions, consider
the insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or
non-admissibiity of reservations and to the effects to them;.. 13
The options available for treaty provisions dealing with reservations are: the prohibition of all reservations, specific enumeration of
permissible reservations, prohibitions of some reservations, and non1
inclusion of a reservation clause. 3 6
b. Arbitration
Multinational corporations have used arbitration extensively in resolving business disagreements. Arbitration generally takes place pursuant to a clause in a contract specifying the type and form of arbitration to be used should disputes arise. International organizations
can waive sovereign immunity when contracting for goods or services
and thus subject themselves to national laws in a particular transaction, or the contract may include an arbitration clause.' 3
133. Hazou, Determining the Extent of Admissibility of Reservations: Some Considerations with Regard to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9 DENVER J. INT'L. L. & POLICY 69, 69-70 (winter 1980).

134. Mandelson, The Constitutions of InternationalOrganizations, [19731 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 145-56.
135. G.A. RES. 598, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) (Jan. 12, 1952).
136. Hazou, supra note 133, at 72.
137. Goekjian, The Conduct of InternationalArbitration, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 410
(Summer/Fall 1979).
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Arbitration auspices or fora are usually divided into two classes;
those arising from a stipulation in the agreement or contract that one
of the specialized arbitration institutions will be used, and those arising on an ad hoc basis . 38 There are many rules and fora available for
international arbitration. Specification of an arbitration procedure
during negotiation of a treaty may encourage nations to join a supranational organization having the kind of supranatural authority contemplated in some forms of an AFR spent fuel storage regime. Arbitration rules may be adopted and applicable on a global basis,' 3 9 a
multilateral basis,1 40 established under national law,1 4 1 or according
to rules promulgated by various trade associations and exchanges. 42
Any combination of rules and fora may be used. An agreement
can provide, for example, for arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) under the rules of UNCITRAL' 1 3 rather
than ICC rules.' " If an international agreement does not specify or
adopt a particular forum or set of rules then ad hoc arbitration is
generally used. When the agreement specifies ad hoc arbitration, the
parties must include in the agreement procedures for selecting the
arbitration board and governing rules.' "
c. Sanctions
Sanctions constitute the systematic reactions to detected violations of a nation's defined obligation. Such sanctions can be "individual" or "collective," depending on whether the offending nations act
individually or in concert with other nations. Sanctions can also be
"informal" or "formal." Informal sanctions take the form of actions
allowed under international law without special justification. Formal
sanctions are actions that would be illegal if they did not constitute
a proper response to an international violation. Any sanction can
take on some combination of these two attributes. The most effective type of sanction is the formal, collective sanction.' 46
138. Id.
139. For example, the rules of arbitration recently enacted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law called the UNCITRAL Rules.
140. Arbitration rules have been adopted by the Economic Commission of Europe, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
141. For example, the ARBITRATION ACT of the UNITED KINGDOM, and THE
UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT, 8 U.S.C. § § 1-14 (1970).
142. For example, the Coffee Exchange.
143. See supra note 139.
144. Goekjian, supra note 137, at 411-13.
145. Id. at 414.
146. Szasz, Sanctions and InternationalNuclear Controls, 11 CONN. L. REV. 545, 54647 (Spring 1979).
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The ultimate purpose of a sanction is to prevent undesirable behavior or make such behavior less likely. One type of sanction can
make an undesirable action impossible, for example, a cutoff of supplies necessary to the offending nation's undesirable activity. The imposition of unpleasant circumstances upon the offending nation, provides an alternative type of sanction. This sanction will succeed only
if the offending nation does not consider its sanctionable acts as vital
to its well-being. The nations' leaders must perceive rationally that
the offensive action is no longer worth the consequences. A sanction
need not be directly "linked" to the activity in question.' 4 ' For example, a nonweapons state which makes overt progress towards fabrication of a nuclear explosive device may already have access to the
necessary equipment and materials, but it may be possible to exert
utterly ruinous pressure on the offending nation's economy if it insists on producing nuclear weapons.' 48
Effective sanctions require five conditions. First, the application of
the sanctions must be certain and irrevocable. Second, the sanction
must be clear and flexible enough to allow graduated responses to
any resistance or acquiescence to the sanction. Third, the sanctions
must be legal under international law as a reaction to an illegal act so
that all nations are free to uphold sanctions as they are imposed.
Fourth, sanctions must relate to the offense. Linkage to other issues,
therefore, is usually inappropriate. Lastly, the sanction must be directed at a relatively small number of nations: the fewer beligerent
states involved, generally, the more effective the sanction.' 49
Sanctions generally should be linked to a specific undertaking or
obligation assumed by the offending nation, and should be applied
only to an activity clearly contrary to the offending nation's agreement not to engage in the offensive activity. The burdens of applying
sanctions should also be shared by those nations most able to bear
the costs. Nations must share the cost of sanctions especially where
the offending nation can threaten, economically or militarily, any
allies involved in the sanction activity. Sanctions can be supply
oriented (a cutoff of resources), political (withdrawal or diplomatic
relations), economic (cutoff of aid on assistance), or military (use of
force).'
147.
148.
1977).
149.
150.

0

5

Id. at 548-49.
International Security Assistance Act of 1977, § 12, 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (Supp. 1
Szasz, supra note 146, at 551-54.
Id. at 569-80.
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E. PotentialInstitutionalAlterationsfor InternationalAuspices
This section considers the characteristics described in Section D as
they might apply to an international spent fuel storage regime. This

discussion does not purport to arrive at the "optimal" multinational
arrangement, since such arrangement depends on interests and goals
not yet ascertained. In addition, the next decade will most likely produce more coherent international policies concerning the "back end"
of the nuclear fuel cycle. The recent policy shifts of Australia and
Canada on prior approval on a broader basis for reprocessing strengthen this expectation.'

1. Classifications
Member nations evidently would have more confidence in a public
rather than a private international organization since assets held in a
private international organization can be subject to attached and
seized in private lawsuits in national courts.' 5 2 The concept of sovereign immunity is important to all member nations. The charter establishing the organization will dictate the limits of such immunity.
The tradeoff between protecting the health and safety of the host
nation and creating the desired immunity from the host nation's legal
proceedings must be established during negotiation. The host nation
will seek substantial control over safety and safeguards operations,
but the level of direct control may be limited by the authority of
member nations to exercise control over spent fuel movements or
transfers. Contingency plans for the protection of the host nation's
public in the event of a real threat should be considered in negotiations. During the charter negotiations, credible generic threats could
be enumerated along with appropriate responses by the host nation.
Contingencies requiring host nation corrective action will probably
be limited and relatively easy to plan for because of the limited
threat presented by a spent fuel storage facility.
The scope of an international organization's operations are difficult to predict because the primary goal of a spent fuel storage regime is still unclear. A commitment on the part of the organization
to achieve a global solution to a common problem must underlie the
organization's universal character. The attitudes of various nations
toward spent fuel disposition vary widely, and an agreement on
151. A Draft Agreement Between Euratom and Australia, Nucleonics Week Feb. 5,
1981, at 6-7.
152. See supra notes 54-6 and associated text.
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global goals is unlikely. On the other hand, if nonproliferation is the
primary goal of such an institutional arrangement, universality best
serves the organization, since all nations can participate in preventing
proliferation. A more regional arrangement may be preferable, however. Unlike the promotion of radio communication and world
health, different nations approach the disposition of spent fuel with
widely divergent goals. Universality may prove unobtainable.
Congress clearly contemplates a regional organization in enacting
the NNPA, since only those nations adhering to U.S. nonproliferation
goals may join the International Nuclear Fuel Authority.' s 3 If nonproliferation is the goal common to all members, nations not adhering to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
for example, clearly would not qualify for membership. If national
defense or energy policies significantly restrict qualification for membership, then the organization is regional rather than universal.
If the international spent fuel storage facility operates solely as a
depository for excess spent fuel and the facility organization allows
members to withdraw their spent fuel at any time (given sufficient
operational notice) then the facility organization will have little
supranational authority. On the other hand, if the organization imposes release conditions for spent fuel or other means of controlling
member nations' deposits, then it is supranational to some degree.
The purpose of the organization determines the degree of its supranationality. An increasing supranational character requires greater
power in the organization's judicial branch to review the organization's decisions.
If the international organization is regional in character, but pursues goals which meld various national interests, it has acquired some
of the attributes of supranationality. A typical goal for such an organization may involve limiting the release of spent fuel only for satisfying a nation's energy program needs. The establishing charter of
the organization may include a set of release criteria which link members' energy needs with acceptable releases. Thus, a nation seeking to
reprocess spent fuel despite sufficient reserves of low enriched uranium may be denied permission. Release criteria may be discriminatory (i.e., different release criteria for nuclear weapons states) or may
be equally applicable to all member nations. A high level of supranational authority can only originate with a group of nations in a highly
cooperative endeavor sharing a commonality of goals.
An international organization for spent fuel storage may act in a
very limited function or could pursue expansive goals including the
153. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, § 104, 22 U.S.C. § 3223 (Supp. 1 1978).
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creation of an international forum for matching and complementing
member nation's nuclear energy objectives. As the goals of the organization become more comprehensive, the organization becomes
more general. Establishing a very functional organization may minimize initial differences between nations. As member nations' energy
policies become more coherent, however, the organization should
evolve towards accomplishing more general goals. The future needs
of advanced breeder nations will complement the waste disposal
problems of those nations intending to use only light water or natural
uranium reactors. An international organization for spent fuel management may be a good forum for negotiating the specifics of an international nuclear fuel cycle in which breeder nations purchase
spent fuel in exchange for new reactor fuel for nonbreeder members.
Such a scheme must account for the fact that international organizations would enjoy immunity from national politics while private international organizations (i.e., a multinational corporation) would
not. An international organization offers a far more stable form of
international cooperation than private enterprise. To promote stability in long-term energy cooperation, a functional organization with
the potential for more general forms of cooperation should be developed.
2. Participants
In a functional and universalist international organization operating an AFR spent fuel storage facility, participation would be open
to any nation and the organization would avoid politically sensitive
i~sues. Probably no international organization could be completely
universal and functional, since energy issues tend to reflect regional
biases and create political conflict. The complexity of the organization and the types of memberships available will be strongly tied to
the goal of the organization. Adherence to nonproliferation norms, in
itself, contributes greatly to the political nature of the organization
since the organization seeks a status quo among weapons and nonweapons nations. The promotion of a status quo further reinforces
the superior strategic status of weapons nations.
If the organization is regional, conditions for membership and the
character of participation rights can be dictated with less difficulty.
Conditions for new membership can also be more easily enumerated
in a regional organization. The right of withdrawal may be discussed
during negotiation of the charter. While withdrawal cannot be prohibited, the organization can make withdrawal difficult for member
nations by requiring a period of notice and continued participation
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during that period. Sanctions also may be included in the charter for
members not upholding their commitments to the organization.
3. Structure
Much of the literature on international organizations functioning
in the area of nuclear energy' s 4 indicates that two-tiered management may be desirable, especially if some insulation between the operational tier and political tier is deemed necessary. The secretariat
seems to be the most logical entity for controlling the operation of a
spent fuel storage facility. The availability of international civil servants and the highly technical nature of spent fuel management suggest that the secretariat could manage organs specifically designated
for technical tasks. The organization could create organs for managing spent fuel in storage, for directing transportation of spent fuel,
for interacting with the IAEA, and for developing new techniques of
spent fuel transport and storage.
The organization next could create a board of delegates specifically
instructed to oversee and advise the secretariat. The goals of the organization and the relative importance of its various participants will
dictate the structure of decision-making power on the board. The
major plenary organ could consist of delegates of all members with
power to decide various larger issues such as budget, assessments,
membership, and so on.
4. Judicial Functions
If the charter of the organization contains rules and sanctions,
some forum for appeal of decisions by the board or major plenary
organ will be necessary to assure, to some degree, that rules and sanctions are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. The organization
could assign jurisdiction to the ICJ or a similar forum. The acceptance of the charter by a member nation can constitute acceptance
of a judicial forum and, therefore, its jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The maintenance of spent nuclear fuel from power reactors will
pose problems regardless of how or when the debate over reprocessing is resolved. At present, many reactor sites contain significant
buildups of spent fuel stored in their fuel holding pools. No measure
short of shutting down reactors with no remaining storage capacity
will alleviate the need for away-from-reactor storage.
154. See supra note 57.
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The federal government has committed itself to dealing with the
spent fuel problem. The government has not reached a solution, however, largely because of a debate over differing projections of storage
capacity requirements. Nuclear energy already occupies a questionable position in the future of the U.S. Further delay in development
of a spent fuel management system may prove to be costly. The Senate passed a statute establishing funding for an AFR storage facility
in the last session. The House rejected it, however, fearing that temporary storage would, in fact, become permanent storage.' l ' The
House approach involves establishing a program for development of
permanent waste repositories as a prerequisite to temporary storage.
This near-sighted political stance taken by the House ignores reality.
Temporary storage will be needed regardless of any resolution of the
nuclear energy debate. A U.S. policy reversal seems likely, since the
current Administration favors plans for reprocessing spent fuel to recover unburned uranium and plutonium. The actual resolution of the
debate concerning reprocessing, however, may be years away. The
determination of what actually constitutes "waste" in the nuclear
fuel cycle could take a decade to decide. If reprocessing occurs and
residual plutonium and uranium are recycled, then nuclear waste will
differ greatly from ordinary spent fuel. Consequently, the issue of
establishing a permanent repository, as a technical reality, must await
a decision on reprocessing. The issue of spent fuel storage requires no
such prior resolution.
Proliferation of weapons grade nuclear material in many nations
around the world presents another pressing issue. If nations with
small nuclear programs are forced to deal with their own spent fuel
accumulations, they will either have to reprocess it indigenously or
contract to have it reprocessed in a foreign reprocessing plant. In
either case, those nations with small nuclear programs, left to their
own means of managing spent fuel may eventually possess sufficient
resources to assemble a nuclear weapon. Such a situation could
threaten global security in periods of significant international tension. Non-nuclear weapons nations could be virtually forced to "gonuclear" for their own perceived protection. The U.S. could retard or
stifle proliferation altogether by accepting spent fuel from nonnuclear nations and compensating them with new reactor fuel not
containing weapons grade material (as the Nonproliferation Act
directs).
The problem of spent fuel management demands real global solu155. The Energy Daily, Dec. 5, 1980, at 5; Nuclear Fuel, Dec. 8, 1980, at 12; H.R. 8378,
90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).
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tions. The current trend of nations toward energy independence may
be a proper response to recent oil embargos, but will not promote the
proper management of the very material from which nuclear weapons
are made. Reason dictates that short-sighted political goals be abandoned for more far-sighted and realistically viable goals. Further delay in solving the problem of spent nuclear fuel accumulation, both
nationally and globally, can benefit only a small class of elected officials in the short term and may inflict substantial costs on the American public, and possibly the whole world, in the long run. An issue
of such importance merits serious consideration by the American
government-just as NNPA directs.

